anticompetitive. Second, the Commission contends that the D.C. Circuit misapplied relevant precedent to conclude that the loss of an opportunity to obtain a RAND commitment by the SSO was not an anticompetitive effect. Third, the Commission argues that current requirements for causation under Section 2 are unclear and in need 1 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008 ), cert. denied, No. 08-694, 2009 WL 425102, at *1 (Feb. 23, 2009 of further guidance from the Court. Fourth, the Commission points to what it believes is a split between the Third and D.C. Circuits on the question of whether deception is a proper basis for liability under Section 2. Fifth, and finally, the Commission suggests that inconsistent application of antitrust laws in the context of SSO agreements has the potential to create confusion that will lead to decreased participation and ultimately consumer harm.
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In this article, I evaluate the Commission's case in support of Supreme Court review, concluding that it is ultimately unpersuasive. Moreover, the article suggests that the patent holdup problems, and ex post opportunism generally, is more effectively handled by contract and patent law. Because parties cannot contract around heavy mandatory antitrust remedies, contract and patent law offer superior substantive doctrine designed to distinguish good faith contractual modifications from bad faith holdup, thereby minimizing the social welfare reducing decision errors. We begin by evaluating the centerpiece of the Commission's case in favor of certiorari.
I. A Defense of the D.C. Circuit's Causation Standard
The Commission argues that the D.C. Circuit imprudently adopted an overly stringent "but-for" causation standard. According to the Commission, the D. 
II. When Is Deceptive and Price-Increasing Conduct Exclusionary Under Section 2?
Whether deception can potentially constitute actionable exclusionary conduct under Section 2 depends both on when it occurs relative to the acquisition of monopoly power and whether it results in the exclusion of rivals or a mere increase in price.
NYNEX immunizes a firm from antitrust liability if the firm (1) first lawfully acquired monopoly power and (2) then committed fraud or engaged in other deceptive conduct (3) that allowed it to evade pricing constraints to the detriment of consumers. On the other hand, NYNEX would not immunize a firm that (1) committed fraud and (2) thereby acquired market power (3) exercised in the form of evading a RAND commitment. Accordingly, if Rambus's deception preceded its possession of monopoly power, the Commission is correct in arguing that either causal path-(1) exclusion of non-proprietary technology or (2) Rambus with a RAND pricing constraint-involves an anticompetitive effect that is actionable under Section 2. However, if Rambus acquired its monopoly power prior to committing its deceptive acts NYNEX precludes the Commission from asserting that causal path as an actionable Section 2 violation.
How could Rambus have acquired monopoly power prior to its deceptive conduct? Consider two possible scenarios. In the first, Rambus has a strong patent and strong technology compared to rivals that it is highly likely to be selected for the standard, or at the least become the de facto standard. In the second, Rambus has a weak patent and weak technology that is unlikely to be included in a standard on the 
III. Certiorari Was Not Necessary to Resolve Confusion Over the Causation Standard Under Section 2
The Commission also raises the concern that confusion over the correct causation standard under Section 2 warrants the Supreme Court's attention. For the reasons discussed above, the D.C. Circuit correctly required the Commission to separate the causal link between Rambus's deceptive conduct and any effects because, depending on when Rambus obtained monopoly power, the bad acts may be immunized under NYNEX. This causal requirement is not novel. Nor does a significant legal dispute exist over the appropriate causation standard to apply under Section 2. The causation debate is simply a factual dispute over whether the Commission demonstrated that illegal conduct occurred-hardly a matter requiring Supreme Court review.
IV.
Rambus and Broadcom: Circuit Split, Conflict, or Neither?
The Commission also contends that a conflict exists between the D.C. Circuit's decision in Rambus and the Third Circuit's decision in Broadcom v. Qualcomm. The Third Circuit's analysis must be stretched considerably to create a circuit split with Rambus on the issues of causation and applicability of NYNEX. Perhaps such a split will ultimately develop when and if the Third Circuit addresses these questions with facts in the record. As it stands, however, the holdings in Rambus and Broadcom are largely a function of the specific factual allegations, procedural posture, and relevant records in each, rather than an underlying and fundamental doctrinal disagreement over Section 2 that requires the Supreme Court's attention.
V. Will Consumers Be Harmed and Confused If The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari?
Finally, the Commission argues the Rambus and Broadcom decisions create a level of confusion that will deter participation in the standard setting process, ultimately harming consumers. This is unlikely because adequate remedies aside from those offered by antitrust laws already exist under state and federal law.
The debate in patent holdup cases such as Rambus and Broadcom is whether to layer antitrust remedies on top of whatever breach of contract, tort, or patent law remedies are already available to the aggrieved parties. Breach of contract remedies will be available to SSO members, but generally not to non-member third parties, when patent holders violate by-laws that require RAND commitments or disclosure. Indeed, some have argued that damages for breach of contract are in fact superior to antitrust damages, from an optimal deterrence standpoint.
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First, Section 2 provides for treble damages for any violation, plus follow-on private actions in state and federal court. If determination of optimal damages turns on the probability of detection-for example, trebling is required to deter Section 2 violations because the probability of detecting bad behavior is low-it appears that damages need not be as high for patent holdup violations as for antitrust actions. This follows from the fact that holdups typically have a high probability of being detected because, by their very nature, holdups must be announced to SSO members to work. So while third parties may not be able to bring claims, SSO members certainly have the incentive to bring an action. Moreover, it may be the case that expectation damages are closer to optimal deterrence than the alternative antitrust damages. 
